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Abstract 
This paper sets an endogenous fertility model with a two-sector model: one for the final 
goods sector and the other for child care service sector. Results of theoretical analysis 
indicate that the subsidy for children raises the labor share of the child care service 
sector and that it can increase fertility. An aging population reduces fertility and the 
labor share of the child care service sector. In addition to these results, we consider 
monetary policy effects on fertility. Results show that monetary policy can raise fertility 
and the labor share of the child care service sector by virtue of an increase in the pension 
benefit if a pay-as-you-go pension exists. 
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1. Introduction 
This paper sets an endogenous fertility model with a two-sector model: one for the final 
goods sector and the other for the child care service sector. Results of theoretical analyses 
indicate that the subsidy for children raises the labor share of the child care service 
sector and that it can increase fertility. An aging population has consistently declining 
fertility and labor share of the child care service sector. In addition to these results, we 
consider monetary policy. Without a pay-as-you-go pension, the monetary policy does not 
affect fertility or the labor share of the child care service sector. However, if the pay-as-
you-go pension exists, then monetary policy affects fertility and the labor share of the 
child care service sector. 
This paper presents derivation of subsidy effects for children. The labor share of the 
child care service sector increases. Van Groezen, Leers and Meijdam (2003), van Groezen 
and Meijdam (2008), Fanti and Gori (2009), Yasuoka and Goto (2011), and Yasuoka and 
Goto (2015) examine child subsidy effects on fertility. Studies described in the related 
literature do not show the labor share of the child care service sector. This paper can 
derive the labor share in the endogenous fertility model. 
This paper presents consideration of the effect of monetary policy on the fertility. As 
shown generally, monetary policy stimulates aggregate demand and the gross domestic 
product (GDP) in the short run. However, in the long run, the monetary policy has 
neutrality for GDP. By contrast, in the overlapping generations model, the monetary 
policy has an effect on GDP in the long run. This paper presents derivation that an 
increase in the monetary stock can raise income growth rate and fertility. It also 
demonstrates that the labor share of the child care service sector can be affected if a pay-
as-you-go pension exists. This result should be referred in consideration of the policy for 
an aging society with fewer children. Many related papers describe studies of money and 
inflation (De Gregorio (1993), Mino and Shibata (1995), Yakita (2006), Bhattacharya, 
Haslag and Martin (2009), Fanti (2012), Chang, Chen and Chang (2013) and Yasuoka 
(2018a)). 
Our argument asserts the importance of monetary policy. In the short run, monetary 
policy is used as a policy to raise aggregate demand. However, generally speaking, the 
monetary policy effects vanish in the long run. Our paper presents an overlapping 
generations model. Then, the effects of monetary policy exist in the long run. Monetary 
policy raises the inflation rate. Then investment in capital stock increases, representing 
the so-called the portfolio rebalancing effect. Because of this effect, capital accumulation 
is facilitated and income growth can be raised.1 
                                                   
1 Based on data from the Cabinet Office, Japan, the monetary stock increases considerably. In 2015, 
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Finally, fertility increases by virtue of increased income growth. This effect is the 
same as that of the subsidy policy for children. Our paper describes equivalence between 
the subsidy for children and monetary policy. 
This paper presents an examination of how policy affects wage inequality between 
the child care service sector and other sectors. The data show that the wage of the child 
care service sector is lower than that of the average industrial sector.2 Wage inequality 
should not be ignored in terms of income inequality. Results derived through these 
analyses demonstrate that an aging population raises wage inequality between the child 
care service sector and the final goods sector. The subsidy for child care service and the 
monetary policy in the model with pension raises fertility and the share of the child care 
service sector. Thereafter, wage inequality shrinks. The results obtained using the 
analyses presented in this paper are consistent with those found for a real economy as 
shown by Fig.1. 
 
[Insert Fig. 1 around here.] 
 
During 2005–2015, social expenditure for the family increased as the child 
allowance increased. Subsequently fertility and employment for the child care service 
sector increased. These data are explainable by results obtained using the analyses 
presented herein. Data of the wage gap separating the child care service sector from all 
industries are partially inconsistent with results obtained from our analyses. However, 
during 2005–2011 and during 2013–2015, the wage gap shrank. 
Some related papers of the literature examine inequality. Caselli (1999) and Mechl 
and Zink (2004) set a model of two sectors: one for the sector of the high wage rate and 
the other for that of the low wage rate. Heterogeneous ability exists among individuals. 
Because of this setting, the labor share of each sector is determined and income 
inequality occurs. Kim (1989), Werning (2007) and Aronsson, Sjögren and Dalin (2009) 
set the model of the individual ability difference and derive optimal taxation system as 
the redistribution policy. Shindo and Yanagihara (2011) derive that an education subsidy, 
as a redistributive policy, increases welfare. This paper presents examination of the 
effects of the subsidy for child care services and monetary policy as the role of 
redistribution. 
                                                   
the monetary stock was 906.4 trillion JPY; it reached 974.0 trillion JPY. 7.4% rises. The inflation rate 
increased by 0.4% during 2015–2017. 
2 Wage inequality between the child care service sector and the average industrial sector exists. Based 
on data for 2016 (Ministry of Health, Labour and Welfare, Japan), the annual salary of the average 
industrial sector is 4.899 million JPY. However, the annual salary of the child care service sector is 
3.268 Million JPY. The gap is therefore about 1.5 times. 
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This paper comprises the following contents. Section 2 sets the model; the 
equilibrium is derived as explained in section 3. Section 4 describes examination of the 
effect of an aging population on fertility, the labor share, and income growth. Section 5 
examines that policy effects on fertility, the labor share, income growth, and inflation in 
the model without a pension. In section 6, the model with a pension is examined. The 
final section presents salient conclusions from these analyses. 
 
2. Model 
In this model economy, there exist agents of three types: household, firm and government. 
 
2.1 Household 
Individuals in the household live in two periods: young and old. Individuals care for the 
number of children 𝑛௧ , monetary stock 𝑚௧ , and consumption in the young and old 
periods, respectively, as 𝑐ଵ௧ , 𝑐ଶ௧ାଵ. We assume the following log utility function as 
𝑢 = 𝛼𝑙𝑛𝑛௧ + 𝛽𝑙𝑛𝑚௧ + 𝛾𝑙𝑛𝑐ଵ௧ + (1 − 𝛼 − 𝛽 − 𝛾) 𝑙𝑛𝑐ଶ௧ାଵ (1) 
where 0 < 𝛼 < 1, 0 < 𝛽 < 1, 0 < 𝛾 < 1 and 𝛼 + 𝛽 + 𝛾 < 1.3 
During the young period, they supply labor inelastically and gain a wage income 
from which taxes are deducted. They allocate the disposable wage income into child care, 
consumption when young, and monetary stock and saving. Then, the budget constraint 
in the young period is shown as 
(1 − 𝜏 − 𝜀)𝑤ഥ௧ = (𝑧௧ − 𝑞௧)𝑛௧ + 𝑐ଵ௧ + 𝑚௧ + 𝑠௧. (2) 
In that equation, 𝜏 and 𝜀 respectively denote the income tax rate for subsidy policy and 
the pension. Also, 𝑤ഥ௧ denotes the wage income. Furthermore, 𝑧௧ stands for  child care 
service costs, which can be reduced by the subsidy for children 𝑞௧. 𝑠௧ expresses saving. 
During the old period, individuals obtain capital income and a pension benefit. The 
income obtained during the old period is allocated only to consumption. There is no 
bequest. The budget constraint in the old period is presented as 
(1 + 𝑟௧ାଵ)𝑠௧ +
𝑚௧
1 + 𝜋௧ାଵ
+ 𝑝௧ାଵ = 𝑐ଶ௧ାଵ, (3) 
where 𝑟௧ାଵ and 𝜋௧ାଵ respectively denote the real interest rate and the inflation rate. 
Older people can obtain pension benefit 𝑝௧ାଵ. 
Considering (2) and (3), we can obtain the following lifetime budget constraint. 
                                                   
3 Yakita (2006) sets money in the utility model of Sidrauski (1967) form in the overlapping generations 
model. We use the utility function assumed by Yakita (2006). Money in the utility model is considered 
as Walsh (2010).  
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(1 − 𝜏 − 𝜀)𝑤ഥ௧ +
𝑝௧ାଵ
1 + 𝑟௧ାଵ
= (𝑧௧ − 𝑞௧)𝑛௧ + 𝑐ଵ௧ + ൬1 −
1
1 + 𝜋௧ାଵ
1
1 + 𝑟௧ାଵ
൰ 𝑚௧ +
𝑐ଶ௧ାଵ
1 + 𝑟௧ାଵ
 (4) 
We consider a two-sector model: one for final goods and the other for the child care 
services. Based on Caselli (1999), workers must pay training costs to work in the final 
goods sector. However, no training cost is needed in the childcare service sector. Training 
cost 𝜎𝑤௧  is assumed to be distributed uniformly among the workers in [0, 𝜎ത].4 With 
𝑤௧(1 − 𝜎) < 𝑤௧௖, the individual works in the elderly care service sector. Otherwise, the 
individual works in the final goods sector. Then, the indifference equation is derived as 
𝑤௧(1 − 𝜎௧∗) = 𝑤௧௖. (5) 
In that equation, 𝑤௧ and 𝑤௧௖ respectively denote the wage rate in the final goods sector 
and the wage rate in the child care service sector. Therein, 𝜎௧∗ is given to hold the (5), 
with no difference between the final sector and child care sector. Then, ఙ
∗
ఙഥ
 of younger 
people work in the final goods sector and ఙഥିఙ
∗
ఙഥ
 of them work in the child care service 
sector. Without loss of generality, we set 𝜎ത = 1. 
If the household consists of workers in both the final goods sector and the child care 
service sector, then the lifetime budget constraint can be presented as5 
(1 − 𝜏 − 𝜀) ൭ቆ𝜎𝑡∗ −
𝜎𝑡
∗2
2
ቇ 𝑤𝑡 + (1 − 𝜎𝑡∗)2𝑤𝑡൱ +
𝑝௧ାଵ
1 + 𝑟௧ାଵ
= (𝑧௧ − 𝑞௧)𝑛௧ + 𝑐ଵ௧ + ൬1 −
1
1 + 𝜋௧ାଵ
1
1 + 𝑟௧ାଵ
൰ 𝑚௧ +
𝑐ଶ௧ାଵ
1 + 𝑟௧ାଵ
. 
(6) 
Then, considering lifetime budget constraint (6), the optimal allocations to maximize 
the utility (1) are derived as presented below. 
𝑛௧ =
𝛼 ൭(1 − 𝜏 − 𝜀) ቆ൬𝜎𝑡∗ −
𝜎𝑡
∗2
2 ൰ 𝑤𝑡 + (1 − 𝜎𝑡
∗)2𝑤𝑡ቇ +
𝑝௧ାଵ
1 + 𝑟௧ାଵ
൱
𝑧௧ − 𝑞௧
 
(7) 
𝑚௧ =
𝛽 ൭(1 − 𝜏 − 𝜀) ቆ൬𝜎𝑡∗ −
𝜎𝑡
∗2
2 ൰ 𝑤𝑡 + (1 − 𝜎𝑡
∗)2𝑤𝑡ቇ +
𝑝௧ାଵ
1 + 𝑟௧ାଵ
൱
1 − 11 + 𝜋௧ାଵ
1
1 + 𝑟௧ାଵ
 (8) 
                                                   
4 Yasuoka (2018b) sets the two-sector model: a final goods sector and an elderly care service sector. 
Yasuoka (2018b) assumes that the elderly care service sector requires no training cost compared to the 
final goods sector. As might be readily apparent, this training cost is relative. The high training cost 
means that the person has high ability to work in the elderly care service sector. 
5 Noting that 𝑤ഥ௧ = ∫ 𝑤𝑡(1 − 𝜎)
1
𝜎ത
𝑑𝜎
𝜎𝑡∗
଴ + (1 − 𝜎𝑡
∗)𝑤𝑡𝑐 = 𝑤𝑡 ቀ𝜎𝑡∗ −
𝜎𝑡∗2
2
ቁ + (1 − 𝜎𝑡∗)(1 − 𝜎𝑡∗)𝑤𝑡, one obtains 
ቀ𝜎௧∗ −
ఙ೟∗మ
ଶ
ቁ 𝑤௧ + (1 − 𝜎௧∗)ଶ𝑤௧. 
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𝑐ଵ௧ = 𝛾 ቌ(1 − 𝜏 − 𝜀) ൭ቆ𝜎𝑡∗ −
𝜎𝑡
∗2
2
ቇ 𝑤𝑡 + (1 − 𝜎𝑡∗)2𝑤𝑡൱ +
𝑝௧ାଵ
1 + 𝑟௧ାଵ
ቍ (9) 
𝑐ଶ௧ାଵ = (1 + 𝑟௧ାଵ)(1 − 𝛼 − 𝛽 − 𝛾) ቌ(1 − 𝜏 − 𝜀) ൭ቆ𝜎𝑡∗ −
𝜎𝑡
∗2
2
ቇ 𝑤𝑡 + (1 − 𝜎𝑡∗)2𝑤𝑡൱ +
𝑝௧ାଵ
1 + 𝑟௧ାଵ
ቍ (10) 
 
2.2 Firm 
This model economy includes two sectors of production: the final goods sector and the 
child care service sector. 
The production function in the final goods sector is assumed as 
𝑌௧ = 𝐾௧ఏ(𝐴௧𝐿௧)ଵିఏ, 0 < 𝜃 < 1. (11) 
Therein, 𝑌௧ denotes the output of final goods. The output is inputted by capital stock 𝐾௧ 
and labor input 𝐿௧. 𝐴௧ = 𝑎
௄೟
௅೟
 is assumed (0 < 𝑎). This model considers the capital stock 
externality addressed by Romer (1986) and by Grossman and Yanagawa (1993). 
With a competitive market and profit maximization, wage rate 𝑤௧ and real interest rate 
𝑟௧ in the final goods sector are given as 
𝑤௧ = (1 − 𝜃)𝑎ଵିఏ𝑘௧, and (12) 
1 + 𝑟௧ = 𝜃𝑎ଵିఏ , (13) 
where 𝑘௧ =
௄೟
௅೟
. We assume that the capital stock is fully depreciated in a period. 
The production function in the child care service sector is assumed as 
𝑌௧௖ = 𝑧௧𝜌𝐿௧௖ , 0 < 𝜌, (14) 
where 𝑌௧௖ and 𝐿௧௖ respectively represent output for child care services and labor input 
for child care services.6 Then, defining the profit in the child care service sector as 
𝑧௧𝜌𝐿௧௖ − 𝑤௧௖𝐿௧௖, the wage rate of the child care service sector is given as 
𝑧௧𝜌 = 𝑤௧௖ . (15) 
Now, we consider 𝑁௧ as the population size of younger people. Then, the following 
equations can be derived: 
𝐿௧ = 𝜎𝑡∗𝑁௧, (16) 
𝐿௧௖ = (1 − 𝜎𝑡∗)𝑁௧. (17) 
                                                   
6 This production function, which includes only labor input, is assumed by Yasuoka and Miyake (2010), 
Hashimoto and Tabata (2010), and others for studies in which child care or elderly care is examined. 
Child care and elderly care are considered as labor-intensive services. 
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2.3 Government 
The government provides a subsidy for child care services, which is the same as the child 
allowance in this model, and a pension benefit. 
The child care service subsidy is financed by an income tax, for which the tax rate is 
𝜏. With a balanced budget, the budget constraint of the child care service is given as 
𝜏 ൬ቀ𝜎𝑡∗ −
𝜎𝑡
∗2
2
ቁ + (1 − 𝜎𝑡∗)2൰ 𝑤௧ = 𝑞௧𝑛௧. Considering 𝑞௧ = 𝑞𝑤௧, the budget constraint is given as 
𝜏 =
𝑞𝑛௧
൬𝜎𝑡∗ −
𝜎𝑡
∗2
2 ൰ + (1 − 𝜎𝑡
∗)2
. (18) 
The pension benefit is financed by the income tax levied at the tax rate of 𝜀. This 
pension system is a pay-as-you-go pension. The budget constraint is set as 
𝑝௧ାଵ = 𝜀𝑛௧ ൭ቆ𝜎𝑡∗ −
𝜎𝑡
∗2
2
ቇ + (1 − 𝜎𝑡∗)2൱ 𝑤௧ାଵ. (19) 
 
3. Balanced Growth Path 
This section presents derivation of the equilibrium in the balanced growth path. 
Considering (7), (12), (18), and (19), fertility is given as 
𝑛 =
𝛼 ቆ(1 − 𝜏 − 𝜀) + 𝜀𝑛(1 + 𝑔)1 + 𝑟 ቇ ቆ൬𝜎
∗ −
𝜎∗2
2 ൰ + (1 − 𝜎
∗)2ቇ
1 − 𝜎∗
𝜌 − 𝑞
. (20) 
In that equation, 1 + 𝑔 denotes the income growth rate given as ௞೟శభ
௞೟
. Lack of a subscript 
𝑡 shows the variable at the balanced growth path. 
With (7), (17) and 𝜌𝐿௧௖ = 𝑛௧𝑁௧, the market clearing condition of the child care service 
can be presented as shown below. 
𝛼 ቆ(1 − 𝜏 − 𝜀) + 𝜀𝑛(1 + 𝑔)1 + 𝑟 ቇ ቆ൬𝜎
∗ −
𝜎∗2
2 ൰ + (1 − 𝜎
∗)2ቇ
1 − 𝜎∗
𝜌 − 𝑞
= 𝜌(1 − 𝜎∗) (21) 
Considering capital market equilibrium 𝐾௧ାଵ = 𝑁௧𝑠௧  and 𝑠௧ = (1 − 𝜏 − 𝜀) ൬ቀ𝜎∗ −
𝜎∗2
2
ቁ + (1 − 𝜎௧∗)ଶ൰ 𝑤௧ − 𝑐ଵ௧ − (𝑧௧ − 𝑞௧)𝑛௧ − 𝑚௧, one can obtain the following income growth 
equilibrium. 
1 + 𝑔 =
𝑘௧ାଵ
𝑘௧
= ൭ቆ𝜎∗ −
𝜎∗ଶ
2
ቇ + (1 − 𝜎∗)ଶ൱ × (22) 
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ቌ1 − 𝛼 − 𝛽
1 − 11 + 𝜋
1
1 + 𝑟
− 𝛾ቍ (1 − 𝜏 − 𝜀)(1 − 𝜃)𝑎ଵିఏ −
ቌ𝛼 + 𝛽
1 − 11 + 𝜋
1
1 + 𝑟
+ 𝛾ቍ 𝜀𝑛(1 + 𝑔)
1 + 𝑟
𝜎∗𝑛
 
We consider the equilibrium in the monetary market. Notifying 𝑚௧ =
ெ೟
௉೟ே೟
 (𝑀௧ : 
Nominal monetary stock, 𝑃௧: Price index), we can obtain the following equations: 
𝑚௧ାଵ
𝑚௧
= 1 + 𝑔 =
1 + 𝜇
(1 + 𝜋)𝑛
. (23) 
In that equation, 𝜇 denotes the increase rate of nominal monetary stock. 
Then, these equations determine income growth rate 1 + 𝑔, fertility 𝑛, inflation rate 
1 + 𝜋, and labor share 𝜎∗ at the balanced growth path. Wage inequality between the 
final goods sector and the child care service sector can be reduced to 
𝑤௧௖
𝑤௧
= 1 − 𝜎∗. (24) 
With a decrease in 𝜎∗, wage inequality shrinks. 
 
4. An Aging Population 
This subsection presents our examination of how an aging population affects fertility, 
income growth, and other characteristics of this economy. As the factor of an aging 
population, we consider a decrease in the preference for fertility 𝛼. In this section, we do 
not consider the child allowance and pension policy: 𝜏 = 0 and 𝜀 = 0 are assumed. Then, 
the fertility and market clearing condition of the child care service sector are 
𝑛 =
𝛼𝜌 ቆ൬𝜎∗ − 𝜎
∗2
2 ൰ + (1 − 𝜎
∗)2ቇ
1 − 𝜎∗
, 
(25) 
𝛼 ൭ቆ𝜎∗ −
𝜎∗2
2
ቇ + (1 − 𝜎∗)2൱ = (1 − 𝜎∗)ଶ. (26) 
Considering (25) and (26) and total differentiation with respect to 𝑛, 𝜎∗, 𝛼, we can obtain 
𝑑𝜎∗
𝑑𝛼
= −
൬𝜎∗ − 𝜎
∗2
2 ൰ + (1 − 𝜎
∗)2
(2 − 𝛼)(1 − 𝜎∗)
< 0, (27) 
𝑑𝑛
𝑑𝛼
= −𝜌
𝑑𝜎∗
𝑑𝛼
> 0. (28) 
A decrease in the preference for fertility 𝛼 increases the labor share of the final 
goods sector and decreases the labor share of the child care service sector. This is an 
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intuitive result. A decrease in demand for child care services reduces the wage rate of 
the child care service sector. Labor mobility from the child care service sector to the final 
goods sector occurs. As shown by (28), a decrease in 𝛼 reduces fertility 𝑛. Because of 
decreased demand for child care, the labor share of the child care service sector decreases. 
    Effects on income growth and the inflation rate are shown as presented below. 
𝑑𝑔
𝑑𝛼
= −
1 + 𝜌 ൭ 𝛼(1 + 𝑔)(2 − 𝜎
∗)
(1 − 𝜃)𝑎ଵିఏ(1 − 𝜎∗)ଶ −
𝛽(1 + 𝑟)(1 + 𝜋)
𝑛൫(1 + 𝜋)(1 + 𝑟) − 1൯ଶ
൱ 𝑑𝜎
∗
𝑑𝛼
𝜌𝜎∗
(1 − 𝜃)𝑎ଵିఏ(1 − 𝜎∗) +
𝛽(1 + 𝑟)(1 + 𝜋)
(1 + 𝑔)൫(1 + 𝜋)(1 + 𝑟) − 1൯ଶ
, (29) 
𝑑𝜋
𝑑𝛼
= −(1 + 𝜋) ൬
1
1 + 𝑔
𝑑𝑔
𝑑𝛼
+
𝜌
𝑛
𝑑𝜎∗
𝑑𝛼
൰. (30) 
The signs of (29) and (30) are ambiguous. The following proposition can be established. 
 
Proposition 1 
A decrease in preference for fertility (attributable to an aging population) reduces the 
labor share of the child care service sector. Wage inequality ௪೟
೎
௪೟
 is magnified. 
 
If ఈ(ଵା௚)(ଶିఙ
∗)
(ଵିఏ)௔భషഇ(ଵିఙ∗)మ
− ఉ(ଵା௥)(ଵାగ)
௡൫(ଵାగ)(ଵା௥)ିଵ൯
మ < 0, which is brought about by a high level of 𝜋 or 
a low level of 𝑛, then we can obtain ௗ௚
ௗఈ
< 0 and ௗగ
ௗఈ
> 0: an aging population raises the 
income growth rate and reduces the inflation rate. The result of the effect of an aging 
population on the inflation rate is consistent with the case of Japan, where the total 
fertility rate trend is downward sloping. In two decades, the economy in Japan has 
remained in a deflationary state, even after its central bank provided sufficient monetary 
stock. Our model presents the deflationary economy with a decrease in the preference 
for fertility. 
 
5. Policy without pension 
This section presents derivation of how policies of an increase in monetary stock and the 
subsidy for child care service or a decrease in the preference for fertility as a result of an 
aging society affect income growth, fertility, and other model components without a 
pension. 
 
5.1 Monetary Policy 
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We examine how an increase in 𝜇 affects the income growth rate, fertility, and other 
model parameters. The fertility and the labor share of the child care service sector are 
given by (25) and (26). Both the fertility and the labor share of the child care service 
sector are independent of the monetary policy: we can obtain ௗ௡
ௗఓ
= 0 and ௗఙ
∗
ௗఓ
= 0. 
We next check the effects on the income growth rate and inflation rate. Considering 
(22) and (23) and total differentiation with respect to 𝑔, 𝜋, 𝜇 we can obtain the following. 
𝑑𝑔
𝑑𝜇
=
𝛽(1 + 𝑟)(1 + 𝜋)
(1 + 𝜇)൫(1 + 𝜋)(1 + 𝑟) − 1൯ଶ
𝜌𝜎∗
(1 − 𝜃)𝑎ଵିఏ(1 − 𝜎∗) +
𝛽(1 + 𝑟)(1 + 𝜋)
(1 + 𝑔)൫(1 + 𝜋)(1 + 𝑟) − 1൯ଶ
> 0 (31) 
𝑑𝜋
𝑑𝜇
=
𝛽(1 + 𝑟)(1 − 𝜃)𝑎ଵିఏ(1 − 𝜎∗)
𝜌𝜎∗൫(1 + 𝜋)(1 + 𝑟) − 1൯ଶ
𝑑𝑔
𝑑𝜇
> 0 (32) 
Then, the following proposition can be established. 
 
Proposition 2 
An increase in 𝜇 does not affect fertility and the labor share of the child care service 
sector. The income growth rate and the inflation rate can be pulled up by this policy. 
 
Because of an increase in 𝜇, higher inflation occurs. This result seems to be intuitive. 
An increase in the inflation rate reduces demand for monetary stock because the cost to 
hold money increases. Therefore, individuals increase investment in real assets instead 
of a decrease in demand for monetary stock. 
As shown by (25), fertility does not contain either income growth or the inflation 
rate. However, with pension benefits, fertility depends on income growth. The effect on 
fertility can change. We examine monetary policy in the model with pension benefit later. 
 
5.2 Subsidy for child care service 
This subsection presents an examination of how a subsidy for children means that the 
child allowance strongly affects fertility, income growth, and other model parameters. 
With total differentiation of (20) and (21) with respect to 𝑛, 𝜎, 𝜏, 𝑞  at the 
approximation of 𝑞 = 0, we can obtain the following signs: 
𝑑𝜎∗
𝑑𝑞
= −
𝜌(1 − 𝛼)
2 − 𝛼
< 0, (33) 
𝑑𝑛
𝑑𝜎∗
= −𝜌 < 0. (34) 
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An increase in the subsidy for children raises the labor share of the child care service 
sector. This is an intuitive result. Because of an increase in the demand for children, the 
wage rate of the child care service sector increases. Then labor mobility from the final 
goods sector to the child care service sector occurs. However, an increase in the wage rate 
of the child care service sector raises the price of child care services. This effect reduces 
fertility. Finally, this negative effect is smaller than the direct positive effect of the 
subsidy on fertility: fertility can be pulled up by the subsidy policy. 
The effects on income growth and the inflation rate are presented as shown below. 
𝑑𝑔
𝑑𝑞
= −
𝛼𝜌𝜎∗(1 + 𝑔) ൮ 𝑛
൬𝜎௧∗ −
𝜎௧∗ଶ
2 ൰ + (1 − 𝜎௧
∗)ଶ
+ 𝜌(1 − 𝛼)1 − 𝜎∗ ൲
(1 − 𝜃)𝑎ଵିఏ +
𝛽(1 − 𝜎∗)(1 + 𝑟)(1 + 𝜋)
𝑛൫(1 + 𝜋)(1 + 𝑟) − 1൯
ଶ
𝑑𝑛
𝑑𝑞 +
𝛼𝜌(1 + 𝑔)
(1 − 𝜃)𝑎ଵିఏ(1 − 𝜎∗)
𝑑𝜎∗
𝑑𝑞
𝛼𝜌𝜎∗
(1 − 𝜃)𝑎ଵିఏ +
𝛽(1 − 𝜎∗)(1 + 𝑟)(1 + 𝜋)
(1 + 𝑔)൫(1 + 𝜋)(1 + 𝑟) − 1൯
ଶ
 
(35) 
𝑑𝜋
𝑑𝑞
= −(1 + 𝜋) ൬
1
1 + 𝑔
𝑑𝑔
𝑑𝑞
+
1
𝑛
𝑑𝑛
𝑑𝑞
൰ (36) 
Then, the following proposition can be established. 
 
Proposition 3 
The subsidy for children increases the labor share of the child care service sector. 
Fertility increases. The effects on the income growth and the inflation rate are 
ambiguous. Wage inequality between the two sectors shrinks. 
 
The effects on income growth rate are complicated. The tax burden reduces saving, 
which consequently reduces income growth. An increase in fertility reduces the income 
growth effect. These effects are mutually countervailing. Therefore, the effect on income 
growth is not ambiguous, but effect on the inflation rate is ambiguous. 
 
6. Monetary Policy with Pension 
This section presents an examination of how monetary policy affects fertility, the labor 
share of two sectors and other model parameters. Without a pension, the fertility and 
labor share of the child care service sector remain unaffected by monetary policy. 
However, in the model with a pension, fertility and the labor share can be changed by 
the monetary policy. 
Considering (20) and (21), we can obtain the following. 
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𝑑𝜎∗
𝑑𝑔
= −
𝛼𝜀𝑛
1 + 𝑟
൫2 − 𝛼(1 − 𝜀)൯(1 − 𝜎∗) − 𝛼𝜀𝜌(1 + 𝑔)1 + 𝑟
, (37) 
𝑑𝑛
𝑑𝜎∗
= −𝜌 < 0. (38) 
As shown by (37), the income growth effect on the labor share of the child care service 
sector is ambiguous as long as we check the equation. However, we can derive the sign 
of ௗఙ
∗
ௗ௚
 as negative.7 The labor share of the child care service sector increases. Then 
fertility increases if the monetary policy can raise income growth. 
Income growth and the inflation rate are given as  
𝑑𝑔
𝑑𝜇
=
1 + 𝜋
1 + 𝜇
1 + 𝐵𝐶(1 + 𝜋)𝐴(1 + 𝑔)
 (39) 
𝑑𝜋
𝑑𝜇
= −
(1 + 𝜋)𝐶
1 + 𝑔
𝑑𝑔
𝑑𝜇
+
1 + 𝜋
1 + 𝜇
 (40) 
where 
𝐴 =
⎝
⎜
⎜
⎜
⎜
⎛
𝜎 +
𝜀 ൮𝛼 + 𝛽
1 − 1(1 + 𝑟)(1 + 𝜋)
+ 𝛾൲ ൬𝜎∗ − 𝜎
∗ଶ
2 + (1 − 𝜎
∗)ଶ൰
1 + 𝑟
⎠
⎟
⎟
⎟
⎟
⎞
𝑛 
−
⎝
⎜
⎜
⎜
⎜
⎜
⎛
(1 − 𝜎∗) ቌ1 +
𝜎∗(1 − 𝜎∗)
𝜎∗ − 𝜎
∗ଶ
2 + (1 − 𝜎
∗)ଶ
ቍ −
⎝
⎜
⎜
⎜
⎜
⎛
𝜎 +
𝜀 ൮𝛼 + 𝛽
1 − 1(1 + 𝑟)(1 + 𝜋)
+ 𝛾൲ ൬𝜎∗ − 𝜎
∗ଶ
2 + (1 − 𝜎
∗)ଶ൰
1 + 𝑟
⎠
⎟
⎟
⎟
⎟
⎞
⎠
⎟
⎟
⎟
⎟
⎟
⎞
×
𝜌(1 + 𝑔) 𝛼𝜀𝑛1 + 𝑟
൫2 − 𝛼(1 − 𝜀)൯(1 − 𝜎∗) − 𝛼𝜀𝜌(1 + 𝑔)1 + 𝑟
 
 
𝐵 =
𝛽(1 + 𝑟) ቆ(1 − 𝜀)(1 − 𝜃)𝑎ଵିఏ + 𝜀(1 + 𝑔)1 + 𝑟 ቇ ൬𝜎
∗ −
𝜎∗2
2 + (1 − 𝜎
∗)2൰
(1 + 𝜋)ଶ(1 + 𝑟)ଶ − 1
> 0  
                                                   
7 See the Appendix for a detailed proof. The model with a pension benefit brings about the dynamics. 
The Appendix presents dynamics in the model with a pension. 
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𝐶 = 1 +
𝜌𝛼𝜀
1 + 𝑟
൫2 − 𝛼(1 − 𝜀)൯(1 − 𝜎∗) − 𝛼𝜀𝜌(1 + 𝑔)1 + 𝑟
> 0  
With small 𝜀, one can obtain 𝐴 > 0; then ௗ௚
ௗఓ
> 0 holds. Therefore, the following 
proposition can be established. 
 
Proposition 4 
In the model with the small level of pension, an increase in 𝜇 raises the labor share of 
the child care service sector and fertility because of an increase in income growth. 
 
Fertility depends on monetary policy because monetary policy changes the income 
growth rate and because the pension benefit depends on the income growth rate if the 
pension benefit is considered. With a small pension, the income growth rate increases. 
As shown by (37), the labor share of the child care service sector rises. Then, fertility can 
be pulled up as shown by (38). An increase in the income growth raises the pension 
benefit. Subsequently, the lifetime income rises and the demand for child care can be 
pulled up. 
 
7. Conclusions 
This paper sets an endogenous fertility model with monetary policy and examines how 
the labor share of the final goods sector and the labor share of the child care service 
sector are changed by monetary policy, a subsidy for child care service, and other model 
parameters. The subsidy for child care services raises the labor share of the child care 
service sector and raises fertility. An aging society with a decrease in preference for 
having children reduces the labor share of the child care service sector and reduces 
fertility. 
Fertility and the labor share of the child care service sector are influenced by 
monetary policy because of the effects of an increase in the pension benefit. This 
monetary policy raises the income growth rate. Thanks to an increase in the income 
growth, the pension benefit increases. Then, demand for child care services and fertility 
increase. 
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Appendix 
The sign of 𝒅𝝈
∗
𝒅𝒈
 (37) 
Defining 𝐿 = α ቆ(1 − 𝜀) ൬ቀ𝜎∗ − 𝜎
∗2
2
ቁ + (1 − 𝜎∗)2൰ + ఌ௡(ଵା௚)
ଵା௥
ቇ and 𝑅 = 𝜌(1 − 𝜎∗)ଶ as shown by 
(21), respectively, we can depict the following figure. We assume that α <  𝜌. Without 
this assumption, we can obtain 𝜎∗  in the model without pension. Therefore, this 
assumption must have equilibrium. 
 
[Insert Fig. A.1 around here] 
 
 We can obtain the intersection of L and R and show that an increase in 𝑔 reduces 𝜎∗. 
 
Dynamics in the model with a pay-as-you-go pension 
With a pay-as-you-go pension, the dynamics occurs in the model. The dynamics in this 
model is shown as 
𝑛௧ =
𝛼𝜌
⎝
⎜
⎛
(1 − 𝜀) ൬𝜎௧ −
𝜎௧ଶ
2 + (1 − 𝜎௧)
ଶ൰ +
𝜀𝑛௧(1 + 𝑔௧) ൬𝜎௧ାଵ −
𝜎௧ାଵଶ
2 + (1 − 𝜎௧ାଵ)
ଶ൰
1 + 𝑟
⎠
⎟
⎞
1 − 𝜎௧
. 
(B.1) 
𝑛௧ = 𝜌(1 − 𝜎௧). (B.2) 
1 + 𝑔௧ =
1
𝜎௧ାଵ𝑛௧
× ൮ቌ1 − 𝛼 −
𝛽
1 − 11 + 𝜋
1
1 + 𝑟
− 𝛾ቍ (1 − 𝜀)(1 − 𝜃)𝑎ଵିఏ ቆ𝜎௧ −
𝜎௧ଶ
2
+ (1 − 𝜎௧)ଶቇ 
−
ቌ𝛼 + 𝛽
1 − 11 + 𝜋
1
1 + 𝑟
+ 𝛾ቍ 𝜀𝑛௧(1 + 𝑔௧) ൬𝜎௧ାଵ −
𝜎௧ାଵଶ
2 + (1 − 𝜎௧ାଵ)
ଶ൰
1 + 𝑟
 
(B.3) 
1 + 𝜋௧ =
1 + 𝜇
(1 + 𝑔௧)𝑛௧
. (B.4) 
We replace (B.1), (B.3), and (B.4) with the following equations: 
𝑛௧ = 𝑛(𝜎௧, 𝜎௧ାଵ, 𝑔௧ ), (B.5) 
𝑔௧ = 𝑔(𝑛௧, 𝜋௧ , 𝜎௧ , 𝜎௧ାଵ ), (B.6) 
𝜋௧ = 𝜋(𝑛௧, 𝑔௧). (B.7) 
The values of ௗఙ೟శభ
ௗఙ೟
 are shown as follows. 
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𝑑𝜎௧ାଵ
𝑑𝜎௧
=
−𝜌 + 𝜕𝑛𝜕𝜎௧
− 𝜕𝑛𝜕𝑔௧
𝜕𝑔
𝜕𝜎௧
− 𝜌 ൬ 𝜕𝑔𝜕𝑛௧
+ 𝜕𝑔𝜕𝜋
𝜕𝜋
𝜕𝑛௧
൰
1 − 𝜕𝑔𝜕𝜋
𝜕𝜋
𝜕𝑔௧
𝜕𝑛
𝜕𝜎௧ାଵ
+
𝜕𝑛
𝜕𝑔௧
𝜕𝑔௧
𝜕𝜎௧ାଵ
1 − 𝜕𝑔𝜕𝜋
𝜕𝜋
𝜕𝑔௧
. (B.8) 
The local stability condition is −1 < ௗఙ೟శభ
ௗఙ೟
< 1 in the steady state. 
 
  
19 
 
 
 
 
Fig. 1 Fertility and Child Care Service Data in Japan (Data: Ministry of Health, Labour 
and Welfare ‘Demographic statistics’, ‘Basic Survey on Wage Structure’, OECD Statistics 
‘Public Expenditure on Family by Type of Expenditure (Cash and in Kind), in % GDP’.) 
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Fig. A.1: Increase in 𝑔 . 
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